Ir/responsibility and Cooperation in World Society: Current Trends and Long-Term Outlooks

Just three years ago, the editors of *Global Trends* predicted that the world was likely to become increasingly multipolar and therefore “less ordered” and “more chaotic” and that world politics in future would involve a complex “balancing act between highly diverse economic and security policy interests”, with “different normative concepts” of global governance. They called for forward-looking international policies “guided by the precautionary principle and crisis prevention” (Debiel et al. 2012).

There is little sign of this today. Instead, the prevailing impression is one of growing “irresponsibility”, encouraged by a diffusion of responsibility among state and non-state actors. During the Cold War, the superpowers’ respective responsibilities and spheres of influence were clearly demarcated, and their relations were governed – at least to some extent – by certain “rules”. In the 1990s, this gave way to a period of cooperative multilateralism in which the US – now the unique superpower – sought to maintain the global order, albeit as it saw fit, applying its own benchmarks. The hegemonic status of the US was accompanied by the spread of liberal notions of governance, reflected not only in a raft of new agreements and mechanisms at the United Nations (UN) level but also in onward progress towards democracy across the globe [see Liberal Peace in Crisis]. The supposed victory of liberal ideas was also made possible by the emergence of an ideological vacuum in many countries of the Global South after the end of the Cold War. These countries filled the vacuum only gradually with their own values and norms when they began to rediscover their own cultures and history. Now that many countries and regions have achieved a new self-confidence on the back of economic success, these values and norms are increasingly brought to bear on global politics. But what do these radical changes mean for peaceful and sustainable global development? And which other longer-term trends underlie current events, which suggest that today’s world is a place of discord, inequality, conflicts over values and norms, and the destruction of our vital natural resources?

The authors of *Global Trends 2015* attempt to provide answers to these questions and map out the contours of responsible and sustainable future policies.

**A world of discord and irresponsibility?**

The headlines from 2014 create the impression that the world is spinning out of control. A sequence of events that began in autumn 2013 with popular protests against the Ukrainian government of the day escalated from February 2014 onwards into a full-blown armed conflict in the east of the country, which peaked
with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and had claimed at least 4700 lives by mid-December 2014 (OHCHR 2014). With repeated verbal and military provocation by Russia and ever more stringent sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and US, there is currently no prospect of a lasting peace. On the contrary, relations between Russia and “the West” seem to be heading for a new Ice Age. Some observers are even talking about a new Cold War [see Liberal Peace in Crisis].

However, Eastern Ukraine was not the only region in conflict in 2014. The war in Gaza in summer 2014 once again revealed the ongoing tensions in the decades-long conflict between Israel and Palestine. Here too, the prospects of a settlement appear remote. The civil war in Syria, which began in 2011, rages on, with more than a quarter of a million lives thought to have been lost in the conflict (for a discussion of the problematical issue of casualty figures, see Liberal Peace in Crisis). A further 7.6 million people are internally displaced within Syria and there are more than three million refugees (http://syria.unocha.org, 15.1.2015). The conflict took a new turn with the emergence of the jihadist group “Islamic State”, which has proclaimed a caliphate as the home for all true believers and imposed a reign of terror in the vast areas of Syria and Iraq currently under its control [The Rise of “Islamic State” – see Online edition]. Militant jihadists are spilling blood elsewhere in the world as well. In Nigeria, Boko Haram is responsible for an ongoing wave of terrorist violence which culminated in the tragic abduction of almost 280 girls from the north-
ern Nigerian town of Chibok in spring 2014. Most of the girls are still missing. Al-Shabaab militants are wreaking havoc in Somalia and Kenya, while fighters belonging to the Abu Sayyaf Islamist separatist group are terrorizing islands in the southern Philippines. Nor is the West immune to terrorism, as the attacks on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish supermarket in Paris in January 2015 clearly demonstrated. This direct assault on Western liberal values prompted a powerful reaction in their defence. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that the vast majority of people killed and injured in terrorist attacks are Muslims living in non-Western countries [see Figure 1].

But they are not the only victims of the West’s collective amnesia. The debate about the world’s more than 50 million refugees, most of whom come from and are hosted by countries in the Middle East and Africa [see Liberal Peace in Crisis], is generally confined to the West’s capacities to cope with the influx and how to keep it at bay. The international community seems incapable of reacting appropriately to this suffering; let alone putting a stop to it. Its efforts to mount a swift response to fresh humanitarian disasters and conflict escalations regularly fail due to discord and rivalry among the five veto powers in the UN Security Council. In the Ukraine conflict, in turn, it was the emerging economies and developing countries which refused to follow the West’s lead, with most of these countries preferring to remain neutral. It is even more difficult to address the deep-rooted causes of these conflicts, which generally lie in the violation of
values, norms and interests and extreme inequality of development opportunities.

Countries’ mutual mistrust appears to be growing, also in a non-conflict-related context. This is typified by the cases of espionage between “friendly” states which gradually came to light in 2013 and 2014 – from the monitoring of the German Chancellor’s mobile phone by the US National Security Agency (NSA) to the systematic wiretapping of Turkey by the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Despite the revelations about this mutual surveillance, there has been no reduction in cooperation among the intelligence services. Perhaps predictably, there is, instead, a trend towards greater cooperation, largely in response to the upsurge in terrorist activities [see *World Society under Surveillance*].

In light of these observations, to what extent are the world’s countries willing to assume responsibility for protecting global public goods? The wrangling over every tiny step forward in the climate negotiations suggests that a degree of scepticism is justified here; the same applies to the negotiations on the reform of the world trade rules, which are fraught, fragmented and beset by setbacks [see *The Changed Landscape of Global Trade*]. Nor has the international community excelled itself with its belated response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, with the provision of medical assistance slow to get started and serious difficulties in mobilizing adequate funding at first. The years of neglect and chronic underfunding of the World Health Organization (WHO) were partly to blame for the delayed reaction and are symptomatic of an ongoing trend towards the erosion of the mandates and capacities of global institutions (Ulbert 2014, p. 201).
So are we in a phase of general irresponsibility in global politics? And which political and social developments underlie the sometimes dramatic events and upheavals of recent years?

From cooperative multilateralism to confrontational multipolarity: there and back again?

With a number of countries of the Global South now in ascendancy, the liberal international order established in the last decade of the 20th century and its institutions face major challenges. The most obvious example is the rise of the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – but there are many others, with international investors constantly identifying new groupings and dreaming up new acronyms, from the Next Eleven (N-11) to CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) and MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey). The rise of these countries – although occasionally set back by transition crises [The Ambivalent Role of Middle Classes in Transition Conflicts – see Online edition] – has been accompanied by a weakening of the transatlantically oriented global economic architecture, rivalry between state capitalist and market economic ideologies, and a noticeable increase in South-South trade [see The Changed Landscape of Global Trade]. These newly authoritative and self-confident players challenge some of the Western norms and values which form the basis for the liberal world order, not least the balance between national sovereignty and human rights [for example, Global Trends of Peace Negotiations and Conflict Mediation – see Online edition] and concepts of humanitarian aid [see Cultures of Humanitarianism]. This is taking place at a time when human rights protection has already been severely undermined by the Western countries’ all-out “war on terror”. This damages the liberal world order as a whole and delegitimizes its institutions. Against this background, the rising powers are increasingly declining to participate in institutions, bodies and processes in which they consider that they are at a structural disadvantage because their voices are not being heard. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is symptomatic of this problem: although it was born out of cooperative multilateralism, it has recently met with unexpected hostility [see In Troubled Waters: The International Criminal Court (ICC)]. The West’s hopes of continuing to shape global politics in line with its own interests by co-opting the rising powers within the G20 framework have also been dashed, as the disappointing outcomes of recent summits show.

As a consequence, the American political scientist Ian Bremmer (2012), in his bestseller Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World, paints a gloomy picture of a G-zero world in which no single power is prepared to “lead the world” and take responsibility for peaceful global relations. And indeed, the world’s chief characteristic in recent years was non-governance
rather than cooperation – and not only in climate politics [Global Energy Markets in Transition – see Online edition]. In conflicts of interest in other areas, particularly security policy, existing rules are ignored in favour of power-political realpolitik [see World Society under Surveillance].

In parallel, a multitude of alliances, forums and negotiating formats have emerged, often leading to the much-discussed “new complexity”, forum shopping and, occasionally, confrontational modes of behaviour in key policy fields, especially security and climate policy. Stewart M. Patrick has coined the term “the ‘G-X’ world” to capture this “astonishing diversity” of multilateralism (Patrick 2014, p. 62). He predicts that binding multilateral treaties will become less significant due to a growing preference for informal arrangements involving smaller and more effective stakeholder groups. At the same time, all countries are limited in their scope for action as there is no longer a single superpower. Global governance is thus becoming more complex, evident from the negotiating groups involved in the climate process [see Figure 2]. Such radical changes are unsettling for all sides and often lead to a state of denial, frictions and roadblocks at first. Nonetheless, these changes offer the opportunity to break open entrenched structures and overcome some of the rituals that have become firmly embedded in international negotiating contexts.

The lesson we learn from history, however, is that processes are rarely linear. For example, the tectonic shifts currently taking place in the global energy markets are strengthening the US’s foreign policy role, although the significance of this development is still unclear. The US became the world’s largest energy producer in 2013 and now competes with Russia and Saudi Arabia in the export markets [Global Energy Markets in Transition – see Online edition]. A further surge in energy demand is anticipated, especially in the Asia-Pacific, and is likely to pose considerable risks for major importers Europe, China and India despite the current slump in oil prices. This may well have implications for their foreign policy scope.

Upheavals in a transnationalized and (digitally) networked world

Shifting the focus away from the world of states to the realm of societies, it is clear that the major changes in global politics, outlined above, coincide with a number of social, economic and technical processes which are steadily increasing the complexity of policy-making and governance. This is evident from some of the crises which have occurred during the past decade. The contagion and feedback effects of the crises triggered by deregulation and speculation, such as the 2007/08 food crisis and the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, were severe because technological innovations have increased the global mobility of people, goods and data, creating a network of connections in which boundaries, in every sense, have lost their significance.
These processes of deterritorialization and integration compel us to rethink our notions of clearly defined geographical, political, social and, indeed, cultural spaces. This is evident from the debate about “the local”, which no longer means a clearly defined place of comfortable seclusion and localized economic and sociocultural relations [When the Local meets the International – see Online edition]. International development and peacebuilding actors are increasingly focusing on the local level, which offers the promise of greater legitimacy and better implementation of (external) projects and programmes. However, experience has shown that the local level is not as easy to co-opt or control as some international actors would wish, not least because projects
and programmes are increasingly being initiated at this level. Local stakeholders are also making it increasingly clear that they do not only wish to be responsible for implementing predetermined agendas: they want local knowledge to be built into policy-making from the outset.

Due to modern digital communications, economic and cultural globalization has now reached even very remote regions. Although a major digital divide still exists both globally and regionally, the number of Internet users has steadily risen over the past decade. Even in Africa, the continent with the lowest penetration rates of internet and communication technology, almost one person in five now has access to the Internet [see Figure 3].

These technologies have initiated a number of economic, social and political processes which can promote human well-being by creating employment, speeding up previously manual work processes, and facilitating political participation (WSIS 2003). However, they can also change economic life by undermining and eroding labour and social standards. With the formation of major information monopolies, they are also concentrating wealth in the hands of a few (Lanier 2013).

**High economic but low legal integration: changes in the world of work**

Narrowing the digital divide, especially between urban and rural regions, is a key objective of global development endeavours and is also a goal pursued by policy-makers at the national level. The spread of modern communication technologies is also changing the nature of work. For example, non-routine manual occupations are on the decline, whereas non-routine cognitive occupations are increasing worldwide and routine occupations remain stable (ILO 2015, p. 24). However, hopes that the digital economy would become a driver of jobs have not been fulfilled. What’s more, the negative impacts of the world financial crisis on global employment can still be felt. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), around 61 million fewer jobs have been created between 2008 and 2014 than would have been expected had the crisis not struck (ILO 2015, p. 16). This has worsened youth unemployment in particular, a trend which creates a particularly high risk of conflict and has the potential to cause political instability. There is also a risk that an entire generation will never acquire any occupational skills or their skills will become obsolete due to a lack of workplace experience [Youth Unemployment: A Global Challenge – see Online edition].

A lack of employment prospects is also a key cause of migration. Contrary to earlier assumptions, migration is not necessarily harmful for the countries of origin, as migrant remittances show. These financial transfers are now three times larger than official development assistance [Migration and Development – see Online edition].

Employment, however, is not always synonymous with “decent work”. The many disasters in the global garment industry, epitomized by the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory building in Bangladesh in 2013, point to the preva-
lence of working conditions that are an affront to human dignity. They are the outcome of a shift of power in favour of capital, at the expense of socially oriented employment governance. This is partly due to the globalization of supply chains [see Transnational Production and the Future of Decent Work], resulting in a high level of economic but a low level of legal integration. As a consequence, global supply chains are, to some extent, bypassed by national regulatory regimes. New mixed forms of governance (national/international, public/private and, increasingly, private/transnational) now exist in parallel, with the result that employment governance – i.e. the regulation of basic labour standards – is becoming less transparent and “softer”, making it easier for companies to shirk their responsibilities towards workers, including employees of component suppliers. Therefore, at the end of the day, the regulation of transnational corporations will only be effective if it is demanded by a strong civil society and enforced at the level of the nation-state.

Protest and participation in a world of inequality

The concentration of assets in the hands of a few wealthy individuals is one of the causes of widening inequality within societies [Fragmented World Society – see Online edition], which threatens existing democracies and democratization efforts. Although the impression that there is currently a global trend towards increased political opposition is deceptive [Protest and Resistance Movements in the 21st Century – see Online edition], transnationalization and digitalization of protest movements have taken place. This encourages contagion effects across national borders and facilitates global coordination of protest and resistance. The Occupy movement is a good example.

However, in the digital age, political participation not only takes the form of protest. International organizations in particular are making every effort to involve societies, especially in the Global South, more fully in international processes at an early stage, encouraging
them to contribute to policy-making through online surveys, forums and information-sharing. The shaping of the post-2015 agenda is a good example, offering numerous opportunities for participation by civil society groups and individuals [The Post-2015 Consultations – see Online edition]. This has done much to encourage creative reflection at the international level on the definition of human well-being [“You Can’t Eat GDP” – see Online edition]. By engaging in these broader forms of participation, international organizations aim to increase their own legitimacy and improve the prospects of successful implementation of the desired measures later on. Nonetheless, these are still intergovernmental processes – a fact which becomes all too apparent when the time comes for decision-making.

Less individual responsibility = more security?

The ambivalent role of modern information and communication technologies is never more apparent than when it comes to striking a balance between the state’s duty to safeguard collective security, on the one hand, and individual freedoms, on the other. This is a particularly serious issue because freedom is also the determinant of individual responsibility. If individual freedom is curtailed, this denies people the opportunity – and absolves them of the need – to assume responsibility.

The revelations about the activities of the US and UK intelligence services, resulting from Edward Snowden’s leaks to the media, show the full extent to which civil liberties are being eroded by large-scale data gathering (Greenwald 2014) [see World Society under Surveillance]. Nonetheless, Europeans and Americans are willing to accept intrusion on their privacy as the price they have to pay for crime fighting and prevention, according to a representative survey conducted in Germany in May 2014, one year after the start of the Snowden leaks. Less than half the respondents (48%) felt that their privacy and basic rights had been infringed by the activities of the intelligence services, and 22% said that such activities were “justified provided that they enhance everyone’s security” (DIVSI 2014, p. 2). The ongoing debates about the expansion of surveillance, with the recording and storage of personal information in the public space (CCTV) and the private sphere (storage of telecommunications and Internet data), show that liberal societies are treading a fine line in their quest for (more) security. It should be borne in mind, however, that even if we “have nothing to hide”, constant surveillance has an ongoing and negative effect on social relations, as numerous examples from autocratic regimes show.

The debate about the progressive automatization of warfare also concerns the tension between security and human rights protection [From Quantitative to Qualitative Arms Control – see Online edition]. At present, weapons systems are largely human-controlled, but the use of weaponized drones – in some cases in violation of basic principles of international humanitarian law – hints at the potential future capability of autonomous weapons systems, not least their ability to make decisions on
the use of (lethal) armed force without any human input. To avoid “losing our humanity” (Human Rights Watch 2012), all the world’s countries must make a collective effort to agree on common rules. However, it is not only governments that have a role to play here. The developers of these weapons systems must also fulfil their responsibility: the opportunities afforded by ever-greater technological sophistication should only be utilized within a tight legal and ethical framework.

What needs to change? What are the prospects of overcoming the irresponsibility of state and civil society actors and adopting a cooperative approach to safeguard global public goods, such as security, freedom, human rights and the conservation of our natural resources?

Prerequisites for responsible cooperation: recognizing differences, but achieving a basic normative consensus

Many of the current roadblocks in global problem-solving can be attributed to the impacts of the new confrontational multipolarity. Rising powers Brazil, India and China in particular can now act as veto players in many international institutions and negotiating processes because their consent is needed to effect change. And yet they (still) lack the power to shape the international agenda (Narlikar 2013a, p. 561f.). The rising powers have not indicated that they have any wish to radically change the existing system of global governance (Kahler 2013, p. 726), but their reluctance to assume more international responsibility, which would result in different burden-sharing in the provision of global public goods, is one of the factors causing these roadblocks, creating mistrust and threatening to destabilize the entire system (Narlikar 2013a, p. 576).

However, the current spoilers are not only expected to consent to the agreements; they must also actively support them in the interests of effective implementation. This dilemma is most apparent in the global climate process. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was established in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted in 1992, and subsequently became the guiding principle for the climate process. It took tangible form in the different reduction commitments for the industrialized and developing countries, reflecting the former’s historical responsibility for rising greenhouse gas emissions. However, the industrial countries now point out that due to their population size and increased economic power, emerging countries such as Brazil and especially India and China will also have to commit to emissions reductions in future.

The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is a good paradigm for potential solutions: differences are recognized but the aim is to achieve a basic normative consensus on criteria governing the division of these different responsibilities. It thus has the potential to become a guiding principle for justice between nations in the context of the post-2015 agenda as well (Martens 2014, p. 36). However, encouraging – and
allowing – more countries to make the transition from traditional norm-taker to innovative norm-maker would then be essential. Brazil has already taken a pro-active role in this context with its 2011 initiative to develop the *responsibility to protect* into a *responsibility while protecting* and its joint proposal with Germany for the tabling of a resolution on online privacy in the UN General Assembly in November 2013. Rising powers such as India, which have acquired something of a reputation for blocking international negotiations, should be encouraged – according to Amrita Narlikar – to identify those areas in which they are willing to assume more international responsibility in future and come to an understanding on common basic normative principles with other emerging

| Table 1: Key international meetings and conferences, June 2015-2016 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| **Meeting**                  | **Where?**      | **When?**        |
| World Economic Forum on Africa 2015 | Cape Town (South Africa) | 3–5 June 2015 |
| G7 Summit                    | Schloss Elmau (Germany) | 7–8 June 2015 |
| BRICS Summit                 | Ufa (Russia)   | 8–9 July 2015   |
| International Conference on Financing for Development | Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) | 13–16 July 2015 |
| 70th anniversary of the United Nations | New York (US) | 24 September 2015 |
| UN Summit to adopt the post-2015 development agenda | New York (US) | 25–27 September 2015 |
| Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption | St. Petersburg (Russia) | 2–6 November 2015 |
| G20 Summit                   | Antalya (Turkey) | 15–16 November 2015 |
| UN Conference on Climate Change (COP21) | Paris (France) | 30 November – 11 December 2015 |
| World Humanitarian Summit    | Istanbul (Turkey) | 26-27 May 2016 |
| HABITAT III (United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development) | Quito (Ecuador) | 17–20 October 2016 |
| 50th anniversary of the human rights covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR) | New York (US) | 19 December 2016 |
| UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem | New York (US) | 2016 |

Source: Authors’ own compilation
countries (Narlikar 2013b, p. 612f.). This approach could then lead to a radical shape-up of the system towards a reform for responsibility (Narlikar 2013a, p. 576).

Numerous opportunities to chart a new course in this direction are likely to arise in international negotiating processes over the next two years [see Table 1].

Outlook for a reform for responsibility:
institutionalized networking

Due to the “new complexity” of global politics, described above, “mammoth agreements” at the international level are neither realistic nor enforceable at present. Although new public, private and hybrid forms of governance are emerging, they do not constitute a socio-political corrective, and their effects are inconsistent, as the example of global value chains shows. Nonetheless, global challenges and risks can still only be addressed successfully through cooperation, and there is evidence that the pursuit of purely (power-)political interests is counterproductive over the long term [Territorial Reorganization – An International Challenge – see Online edition]. The challenge is to develop rules for all stakeholders in the global value chain through cooperative governance, leading to economic and social security with due regard for planetary boundaries [A Road Map for Sustainable Production and Consumption – see Online edition]. At the same time, the notion of an institutional power hierarchy which extends from the international, regional and national levels down to the local level has been outdated for some time. The aim must therefore be to integrate the highly diverse stakeholders, processes, rules and institutions more effectively across the various levels.

Today, global problem-solving is increasingly taking place against a background of uncertainty, a lack of clarity on responsibilities and accountability, and constantly shifting relationships of power and authority. This not only requires integrated solutions involving governments and traditional civil society (NGOs), businesses and academia [Cities – Spaces of Risk or Opportunities for Active Change? and A Road Map for Sustainable Production and Consumption – see Online edition]. It also requires non-hierarchical decision-making processes which are open to participation by all stakeholders; in the case of sustainability issues, this must include future generations through innovative mechanisms [see Why we Should Give the Future a Seat at the Negotiating Table].

These new forms of Experimentalist Governance (De Búrca et al. 2013), viewed in terms of an “ideal type”, offer scope for an understanding on common definitions of problems and on normative principles for problem-solving. They are also notable for their continuous feedback, reporting and monitoring loops. Procedures should be agreed in advance for the alignment of rules and practices if necessary. The final key element of modes of Experimentalist Governance is networking at various levels: given that it is mainly stakeholders at subordinate levels – including the local level – who are required to
implement the agreed measures, ways must be found to take local or contextualized knowledge into account in problem-solving. Successful “ideal type” examples of Experimentalist Governance include the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (De Búrca et al. 2013) [see Table 2].

These governance modes facilitate new forms of transparency, confidence-building and verification, which are so urgently needed. Forms of Experimentalist Governance depend, however, on a fundamental desire to cooperate and overcome the status quo. Otherwise, institutional networking with built-in “learning loops” will not be feasible. In principle, the implementation of new global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) lends itself to new forms of Experimentalist Governance due to its stakeholder diversity, the need for feedback to local contexts, open definition of problems on which understanding must first be reached through a shared communicative process, range of responsibilities and accountabilities which must be negotiated, and monitoring and review processes (yet to be determined).

Like other forms of political governance, these new governance modes must

<p>| Table 2: Integration and networking of regulation via various governance modes |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance mode</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tr>
<td>International regimes</td>
<td>Comprehensive, integrated international regimes, comprising norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures for common problem-solving in selected areas</td>
<td>Bretton Woods Monetary System, World Trade Regime/WTO, Air Transport Regime/International Civil and Aviation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime complexes</td>
<td>Multiple, in some cases linked or competing forms of public, private or hybrid forms of governance</td>
<td>(Public and public/private) regime complexes on climate protection, protection of intellectual property, forest conservation, health, energy, corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Experimentalist Governance”</td>
<td>Governance as a non-hierarchical, open process with inclusive participation, ongoing consultation on the definition of problems and normative principles, continuous monitoring and review, and feedback from local contexts</td>
<td>Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (including further amendments and adaptations); UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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Source: De Búrca et al. 2013, p. 744, modified and expanded by the authors
be embedded in a network of global norms, institutions and power relations and coupled to a national regulatory framework from which state actors, in particular, derive their authority and legitimacy. This requires a form of “metagovernance” for the coordination of existing pluralism, but it also poses new challenges for national politics. National governments must operate in an increasingly complex environment. Flexibility, management of diversity and forum shopping are required, not only to keep pace with developments but also to shape them in stakeholders’ own interests. Externally, this requires investment in confidence-building, a willingness to renegotiate normative bases and the institutional framework for cooperation, and the development of interest-led alliances beyond traditional pathways (Messner et al., p. 28f.). In line with the concept of Experimentalist Governance, it is not only about inter-state alliances but also about dialogue and, if appropriate, participation by non-state, regional and local actors.

Internally, the interministerial cooperation customarily practised quickly reaches its limits. There is therefore a need for deeper network-type forms of policy integration and coordination. These have similar features to those of Experimentalist Governance at the global level (Steurer/Berger 2010, p. 7). Here too, learning, understanding and adaptation processes among all the participating state and non-state actors are a priority. In the case of state actors, it is no longer mainly about management or monitoring capacities but the ability to mobilize other actors and initiate processes, with subsequent guidance and support from the state. The implementation of National Sustainable Development Strategies has already created various network-type forms of policy integration (OECD 2006).

In a “G-X world”, global coordination mechanisms and an overarching normative framework – in other words, metagovernance – are essential for the fair exercise of responsibilities over the longer term (Sørensen 2006, p. 100ff.). Until now, this has been provided either by the less inclusive club formats, the diverse G-formats, or the major UN conferences, all of which tend to have been used to increase the diversity of multilateralism mentioned at the start. In order to overcome the present mistrust in international relations, mentioned several times, and the ensuing roadblocks, it is essential to build new trust among states and their groupings. This may only be possible with a limited number of partners at first, defined, perhaps, on a regional or interest-led basis. In a best-case scenario, however, this could produce a fairer world order characterized by patchwork governance and various overarching coordination forums in which a much larger number of countries and social groups are able to express their interests and the responsibility for global welfare is established on a broader footing. In order to achieve this goal, there is no alternative to a common approach which initiates a global reform for responsibility.
References


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